


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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPECIAL REPORT

PROSPECTS FOR THE NATO NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE

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### PROSPECTS FOR THE NATO NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE

The future of the North Atlantic Alliance hinges on its current negotiations with France. If the talks continue in the direction they have taken since last spring, the other NATO members--the so-called Fourteen--will reach agreement with France on its continued association with the Alliance. The French, however, will remain outside the integrated military structure. They will continue to insist that they be free to decide when a case of aggression has occurred which would require them to honor their treaty commitment to aid their allies.

The danger in creating such a special status for France lies in setting a precedent which other member states could use at some future date to claim similar treatment and thus seriously weaken the integrated defense structure of the Alliance. There is some chance, however, that taking a tough line with the French would impel them to leave the Alliance altogether. This would raise strategic problems of the first order and lead to further divisions among the Fourteen possibly fatal to the Alliance.

In addition to the form of French association, the Fourteen still have to agree on where to relocate NATO installations now in France and on how to streamline some of the NATO structure. Also under consideration are permanent arrangements for nuclear planning and consultation, and an enlarged political role for NATO in the area of East-West relations.

#### The French Position

On 3 March President de Gaulle notified his NATO allies that France was withdrawing from the NATO military structure. Since then, in a series of notes and negotiations, the French have indicated that they hope to remain in the Alliance, but without any obligation which

would commit their forces to automatic involvement in hostilities. De Gaulle wants to keep France free to decide for itself whether a case of "unprovoked" aggression has occurred.

Over the long term, De Gaulle probably envisions a détente with the Soviet Union, the gradual withering away of NATO,

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and consequent US military withdrawal from Europe. Such an outcome is consonant with his goal of a confederation of independent European states. For the interim, however, De Gaulle probably foresees a loose form of NATO and some US presence to offset Soviet influence and provide a convenient shelter should Soviet policy become more aggressive.

To maintain their independent role, the French will continue to boycott the Special Committee of Defense Ministers on nuclear consultation. They will not endorse any of the plans for a permanent nuclear consultative arrangement which may be worked out at the September meeting of the committee's Working Group on Nuclear Planning.

The removal of US and NATO bases and personnel from France, and the withdrawal of French aircraft and antiaircraft missiles from NATO command and from Germany, will disengage France from any military situations which could result in its automatic involvement in hostilities. The French have been careful in the negotiations on US and Allied re-entry rights to follow De Gaulle's dictum that "not a man, not a stock" from foreign forces can remain in France in peacetime. Strictly interpreted, this principle allows US and Allied re-entry only after an outbreak of hostilities in which France agrees to participate.

The French seem confident they can get what they want when

they meet again with the Germans and with the Fourteen later this month to settle the status and mission of French forces in Germany. They will continue to ask the Germans to accept as the legal basis for the French presence the 1954 London-Paris Agreements, which authorized US, UK, and French forces to be stationed in Germany. They are willing, however, to make a declaration that the exercise of these rights is at German option.

Paris also seems willing to accept a number of German requirements such as the joint flying of national flags over French bases, periodic reports to the Germans on the strength of French forces, and German control of military border crossing points.

In negotiations with the Fourteen, the French probably will try to use the expressed German desire to have French forces remain in Germany as a lever to obtain Allied agreement on French terms.

Paris has left unclear precisely how it intends to cooperate militarily in peacetime, or under what conditions France would go to war in support of its NATO allies. When the talks resume, the French are likely to continue to offer only the vaguest assurances of cooperation. De Gaulle will be prepared to withdraw all French forces from Germany rather than commit them in advance to any specific military action in support of NATO.

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The French are, however, willing to continue their participation in selected NATO infrastructure programs which benefit France without tying it to any automatic military commitment. Among these is the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment Program (NADGE). French participation in an early warning air defense system such as NADGE does not require use of French planes or antiaircraft units and, therefore, would not automatically commit French forces to any military action.

Paris also recognizes that the value to the Allies of French airspace furnishes another negotiating lever. France provides the only direct link between the central and southern fronts of NATO and also the airspace essential to NATO air force mobility in central front operations. The French have placed the overflight rights of each NATO country on a monthly basis.

De Gaulle almost certainly believes he is dealing from strength in negotiating with NATO. The French, therefore, will be in no mood to compromise.

### The Position of the Fourteen

Before the NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels on 6 June, the Fourteen Allies arranged a common negotiating position. They agreed that France should be tied as closely as possible to the Alliance and they expressed the hope that agreement could be reached permitting French forces remaining

in Germany to be available for the common defense.

Their agreed goals were to obtain French consent (1) to accept in a "defense contingency" clearly defined defense tasks within the NATO structure, (2) to establish in peacetime all necessary arrangements in coordination with the respective NATO commands, (3) to place French forces under NATO command in a "defense contingency," (4) to continue participating in the NATO air defense system, and (5) to cooperate in the NATO alert system.

The Fourteen and the French foreign minister agreed that the political aspects of the question of the role and mission of French forces in Germany should be decided by their permanent North Atlantic Council representatives before the military arrangements were discussed by SACEUR (the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Lemnitzer) and the French chief of staff. This accord represented a concession by the French, who had been insisting that since they would aid their allies in case of "unprovoked" aggression, only the military details of such an arrangement remained to be settled by the military staffs.

The foreign ministers adjourned their meeting leaving it to their permanent representatives on the council to arrange the necessary political agreement prior to the opening of the military talks. The

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French, however, have reverted to their previous position. They again insist that a general oral statement to the Fourteen that France remains a loyal member of the Alliance, and will aid its Allies in any case of "unprovoked" aggression, constitutes the required political agreement. The Fourteen have refused to agree to this and want a more detailed written summary of the French position. Faced with an impasse, the permanent representatives agreed to postpone further discussion of the matter. If agreement cannot be reached later this month, the issue will be referred back to the foreign ministers.

Recently, several permanent representatives at the North Atlantic Council have suggested that the Fourteen not renew the talks with the French on this subject and that negotiations between SACEUR and the French military should be avoided. The provisional arrangements adopted last July by the French and Germans covering the continued presence of French forces in Germany would be allowed to continue indefinitely. A showdown between the Fourteen and the French at the ministerial level could thus be avoided and the Germans would not be forced to choose between the French and the rest of their NATO allies.

The Fourteen also will have to decide whether to accept the French offer to continue to participate in certain NATO infrastructure projects, such as NADGE, which benefit

France. This would set a precedent for allowing Alliance members to choose those areas of the infrastructure program to which they wish to contribute and thus threaten the efficient operation of the entire program.

The Fourteen for the present will make no attempt to open multilateral negotiations on the question of overflights of France by NATO aircraft unless the French prove more restrictive in their present bilateral arrangements with each NATO ally. It was felt that such discussions would only serve to invite French tampering with one area of cooperation which is already working satisfactorily.

The Italians, Greeks, and Turks are especially sensitive on the issue of overflight rights because they fear being isolated on the southern flank of NATO if France denies its airspace to allied aircraft. For this reason these three countries may be expected to counsel a relatively soft line toward the French in the negotiations on other issues.

### French-German Negotiations

The Fourteen Allies agree that the bilateral talks between the Germans and French over the legal status of French forces in Germany must parallel those taking place in the North Atlantic Council on the role and mission of these forces.

The Germans initially took a hard line on the issue, rejecting France's contention

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that the presence of its forces in Germany was covered by the 1954 London-Paris Agreements. The Germans maintained that French withdrawal from the NATO military structure suspended the agreements as far as the French were concerned and that an entirely new arrangement was necessary.

Since June, however, the West German Government's position has become less clear and its adherence to a firm line with the French open to doubt. Chancellor Erhard in his 21 July meeting with General de Gaulle stated that West Germany is most anxious to reach a settlement which would allow French troops to remain in Germany. The French President, for his part, conceded the German right to request withdrawal of French troops.

French officials have since made no secret of the fact that they consider that Erhard's request has virtually settled the issue. Bonn Foreign Ministry officials, however, maintain that nothing essential has been conceded to the French, and German and French negotiators made little progress on the French forces issue in recent talks.

At their 3 August meeting the Germans indicated that they would consider the offer by the French to issue a unilateral declaration on the status of their forces. In addition, agreement was reached that bilateral French-German discussions must parallel those taking place between the Fourteen and the French on the role and mission of the French

forces. The two countries then adjourned their discussions until mid-September. The willingness of the French to accept the idea of parallel negotiations may reflect only their confidence that they have almost settled the troop issue.

### US-French Negotiations

With the French intent on ousting US forces from bases in France, there is little to negotiate on the issue other than the precise timing of the withdrawals. The US has refused to accept the 1 April 1967 deadline, which the French have recognized cannot be rigidly applied to all installations. They have asked the US to specify which installations will cause problems and have promised to consider each case separately.

Negotiations on rights to reoccupy these bases in an emergency are still under way, but they hold little promise. The French insist that only in case of hostilities in which they consent to participate will the US be permitted to use the facilities. The US would thus be unable to use these facilities even in times of emergency or tension.

The US and the other NATO Allies probably will have to accept that access to French bases, transportation routes, and storage sites cannot be relied upon in an emergency. SACEUR has warned that without a firm French commitment guaranteeing Allied access to such facilities they cannot be considered in NATO planning,

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and that substitute facilities will have to be built elsewhere.

### NATO Reorganization

The Fourteen, having determined to carry on NATO's functions without the French, are tackling the immediate problem of what to do with NATO headquarters in France. They have also made some progress on streamlining the organization, and are in the discussion stage with regard to a role for NATO in promoting East-West political relationships.

Alliance members have yet to take full advantage of the opportunity to streamline and update the organization, and only a few changes have thus far been agreed upon by the Fourteen. They have approved the merger of the Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) and its two subordinate commands for land and air forces (LANDCENT and AIRCENT). In addition, French withdrawal from the Standing Group, the executive arm of the NATO Military Committee, resulted in agreement to abolish it and to divide its functions between the Military Committee and a new subordinate International Military Staff.

The Allies also continued developing plans to establish a permanent system of nuclear force planning and consultation to replace the temporary Special Committee of Defense Ministers, (the McNamara Committee) which has been working on this subject. The September meeting of the Committee's Working Group on Nuclear Planning

is to formulate a plan to be presented to the Special Committee at its December meeting.

### The Relocation Dispute

With the French deadline of 1 April only seven months away, the Fourteen have only begun to make final decisions on specific sites for the Alliance's major installations.

Decisions have been reached to relocate the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium and the NATO Defense College in Italy. Agreement has been delayed on the selection of the site for AFCENT. No decision has been reached about where to relocate the NATO Maintenance and Supply Services Agency and its large Supply Center. Most important, the issue of the proper locale for the North Atlantic Council still remains undecided.

A final decision on relocating AFCENT has been delayed by competing Dutch and German offers to accept this headquarters. Opposition among the Fourteen to enhancing Germany's already large role in the Alliance has added to the controversy over AFCENT's location.

The decision on a specific site for SHAPE was delayed by the Belgians' insistence that it must be located at least 30 miles from Brussels. They offered Casteau, an economically depressed area southwest of the city where the government owns enough land to prevent land acquisition problems

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from delaying the move past the French deadline. General Lemnitzer and some of the Fourteen's North Atlantic Council representatives opposed the site on grounds that it was too far from Brussels and lacked the necessary facilities for a major headquarters. The Belgians, however, promised to rush construction of necessary facilities and to improve access roads, and the Fourteen agreed to accept the Casteau site.

Allied indecision also has been evident over the question of moving the North Atlantic Council from Paris. The French have stated that they will continue to be represented at the Council and are willing to allow it to remain in Paris if the Allies so desire.

The Fourteen are divided between those who believe the Council should remain where it is in order to keep as many French ties with NATO as possible and those who hold that it must be near SHAPE. At the foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels the Fourteen avoided a final decision on the question by agreeing to reconsider the matter in October.

Progress on the other issues being negotiated with the French is likely to affect the ultimate decision on whether or not to move the Council. The uncompromising position the French have maintained thus far could result in more support for relocation. Recent reports, however, indicate that the Germans and Belgians,

who have previously supported relocation of the council, are having doubts about forcing the issue.

### Outlook

The French can be expected to maintain an uncompromising stance during the coming months. They will hope to capitalize on Bonn's predisposition not to antagonize the French and on divisions among the Fourteen. De Gaulle no doubt anticipates that his Allies' desire to retain the maximum number of ties with France will weaken their resolve.

He will, therefore, not retreat from the position that there must be no arrangement which could in any way involve French forces in hostilities without prior consent of the French Government.

The Fourteen, on the other hand, will face a number of difficult decisions which will determine the nature of the Alliance in the future. Within the next few weeks they must decide how to handle the question of the future role and mission of French forces in Germany and settle on sites for all NATO installations which must leave France.

The Fourteen appear to be leaning toward a compromise which would give France a special status as a loosely associated partner and keep the door open for its future return as a full member. This could lead to similar demands in the future from other disgruntled members which would

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eventually vitiate the integrated Alliance concept.

On the other hand, a firm stand by the Fourteen would test whether De Gaulle's interest in continuing to participate in certain NATO programs of special interest to France might not be great enough to result in some modification of the French position. A firm stand would also be applauded by some of De Gaulle's domestic critics who have maintained that a soft Allied line would strengthen his political support in France if he appeared to be able to get what he wanted

without any sacrifice of French security. They hold that a firm Allied policy would awaken the French public to the dangers to France of De Gaulle's present course. Most of the Fourteen, however, doubt the validity of such assumptions. They view the problems that would result from a showdown with De Gaulle as the greater danger to the Alliance. This would run the risk of provoking the severance of all French ties to NATO, and the loss of all access to French airspace under any circumstances. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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